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Abstract - In this paper, we explore the connection between labor market 
segmentation in two sectors, a modern protected formal sector and a traditional- 
unprotected-informal sector, and overeducation in a developing country. Informality 
is thought to have negative consequences, primarily through poorer working 
conditions, lack of social security, as well as low levels of productivity throughout the 
economy. This paper considers an aspect that has not been previously addressed, 
namely the fact that informality might also affect the way workers match their actual 
education with that required performing their job. We use micro-data from Colombia 
to test the relationship between overeducation and informality. Empirical results 
suggest that, once the endogeneity of employment choice has been accounted for, 
formal male workers are less likely to be overeducated. Interestingly, the propensity 
of being overeducated among women does not seem to be closely related to the 
employment choice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A main feature of almost all developing countries is the presence of a large proportion 
of workers employed in the unregulated-unprotected-informal sector. According to 
the dualistic view, based on the Harris and Todaro (1970) model, jobs are rationed in 
the formal sector due to labor market rigidities of an institutional nature, such as labor 
unions and minimum wages legislation. As a result some workers are forced to accept 
informal sector jobs characterized by precarious working conditions, lack of social 
security and inferior earnings. Most studies of labor markets in developing countries 
find that some characteristics are better rewarded in formal jobs (Pradhan and Van 
Soest, 1995; Tansel, 1999; Gong and Van Soest, 2001). However it is possible that 
rigidities associated with formal jobs might also affect the way workers match their 
actual education with the one required to perform their job. In a segmented labor 
market of such characteristics, as long as the more highly educated workers tend to be 
more productive than their less skilled counterparts, education may not provide access 
to good jobs. A highly skilled worker who is unable to obtain a high-skill job in the 
formal sector may accept a low-skill job in the informal sector for which she is 
overeducated. An individual worker is said to be overeducated if she has acquired 
more education than what is required to perform her job. Overeducation is, thus, often 
taken to imply that resources are not efficiently used, since overeducated workers 
make lower returns on their investment relative to similarly educated individuals 
whose jobs match appropriately their level of education. Here, we assume that 
overeducation in a developing country is not independent of market segmentation into 
formal and informal jobs. 
  
There is now a substantial body of literature addressing the phenomenon of 
overeducation in developed countries.1 An increasing amount of this literature is 
concerned with providing an explanation for overeducation that is consistent with one 
of the theoretical frameworks of the labor market: human capital theory (Becker, 
1964), the job competition model (Thurow, 1975 ) or the assignment models 
																																																								
1Duncan and Hoffman (1981), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), Sicherman (1991), Tsang et al. (1991), McGoldrick and Robst 
(1996) studied the phenomenon for the United States; Alpin et al. (1998), Green et al. (2002), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and 
Chevalier (2003) for the UK; Hartog and Oosterbeek (1998) and Groot and Massen van den Brink (2000) for Holland; Bauer 
(2002) and Buchel and van Ham (2003) for Germany; Kiker et al. (1997) and Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000) for Portugal; 
Alba-Ramirez (1992) for Spain. For an extensive review of overeducation in developed countries see McGuinness (2006).	
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(Tinbergen, 1956). The majority of studies tend to support the assignment 
interpretation, arguing that earnings depend to some extent on both individual and job 
characteristics. These models also imply that there is no reason to expect wage rates 
to be correlated only to acquired schooling or other individual attributes (human 
capital theory), nor should it be expected that individual productivity and, hence, 
earnings will be determined solely by job characteristics (job competition model). In 
addition, a number of studies have also estimated the effects of overeducation on 
earnings. These studies show that overeducated workers tend to earn higher returns to 
their years of schooling than co-workers who are not overeducated, but lower returns 
than workers with a similar level of education who are employed in jobs that require 
the same level of education that they possess.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, few studies have examined overeducation in 
developing countries. Quinn and Rubb (2006) study the phenomenon for Mexico, 
Abbas (2008) for Pakistan and Mehta et al. (2011) for India, Mexico, the Philippines 
and Thailand. One reason for this paucity of studies might be data limitations that 
hinder identification of the education levels required for specific jobs. Moreover, 
despite the increase in recent decades in average schooling attainment in developing 
countries, the average presented in these economies is lower than that presented in 
high-income countries. In Latin American and Caribbean Countries the average 
educational attainment for females and males between the ages of 21 and 24 are 9.6 
and 9.3 years, respectively (Duryea et al., 2007). By comparison, the average for the 
OECD countries is 12.5 for males and 12.8 for females aged between 25 and 34 
(OECD Education at a Glance, 2010). The fact that educational attainment remains 
low in developing countries means that the overeducation is a somewhat contradictory 
phenomenon for these economies. Nevertheless, previous studies find evidence of 
overeducation in developing countries (Quinn and Rubb, 2006 for Mexico; Abbas, 
2008 for Pakistan and Mehta et al., 2011 for unskilled jobs in the Philippines) and 
report that the incidence of overeducation is similar to that present in developed 
economies.  
Given the differences between the labor markets of developed and developing 
economies, it is plausible that the factors accounting for overeducation may differ. As 
has already been mentioned labors markets of developing economies are characterized 
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by a high degree of informality. In the specific case of Latin America, the informal 
sector employs between 30 and 70% of the urban work force (Maloney, 2004), 
embracing a variety of heterogeneous activities, such as self-employed entrepreneurs, 
salaried workers employed in large and small firms, and unpaid domestic workers. 
Besides the well-known negative implications of informality, primarily the result of 
poorer working conditions, a segmented labor market (divided between a formal and 
an informal jobs) might also affect the way workers match their acquired education 
with the education required to perform their job. As Berry and Sabot (1978) affirm, 
“one of the inefficiencies associated with segmentation, more difficult to document 
but possibly imposing greater resource costs on the economies of developing 
countries, involves the failure of the market to move the ‘right’ resources into high 
wage sectors, a failure commonly described by the term ‘mismatch’”. Building on this 
statement, here we assume that the study of overeducation in a developing economy 
with a large informal sector cannot fail to examine the role played by this 
segmentation.  
 
Our assumption also builds on a model developed by Charlot and Decreuse (2005). 
This model show that self-selection in education is inefficient in presence of labor 
market segmentation. As workers do not internalize the impact of their education 
decision on the others wage and employment perspectives, too many workers are 
willing to acquire education and this leads to overeducation. In our opinion, this is a 
reasonable explanation for educational mismatch in the labor markets of developing 
countries that presents labor market segmentation into a formal and an informal 
sector. In contrast with (some) developed countries in which overeducation is clearly 
associated with large endowments of education, the population in developing 
economies presents low or moderate levels of education attainment. Formal and 
informal labor market segmentation is, thus, a phenomenon that could account for 
overeducation in these economies. However, this model it is not able to predict in 
which sector the incidence of overeducation will be highest; in this regard our 
empirical exercise tries to shed light on this issue. 
 
Colombia is a good example of a developing country characterized by the high degree 
of informality in its labor market, and the country’s informal employment makes an 
interesting case to study for several reasons. First, informality today is at the center of 
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economic debate in the country because of the high levels that prevail. Second, 
previous studies have found overeducation to exist in Colombia (Mora, 2005 and 
Castillo, 2007). Finally, studies of informality in Colombia and other developing 
countries focus primarily on the size of the informal sector and on the effects of labor 
market rigidities on employment, wages and their distribution, and on the probability 
of workers entering the informal sector.2 However, little attention has been paid to the 
effects of a large informal sector on the way workers match their education with that 
required to perform their job. If labor market segmentation can lead to education-
occupation mismatches, then it may also affect the allocation of resources in the 
educational system, one manifestation of which is the bias toward academic training 
(Berry and Sabot, 1978).  
 
Summing up, in this paper we study the contribution of working in a formal or an 
informal job on the probability of being overeducated in a developing country with 
low or moderate educational attainment. We hypothesize that in developing countries 
with a large informal sector, educated workers that do not find a high skilled formal 
job may accept an unskilled informal job for which she is overeducated, i.e. informal 
workers are more likely to be overeducated than formal workers. We test the positive 
relationship between informality and overeducation by exploiting information in a 
micro-data set for Colombian workers. In so doing, two types of empirical models are 
used: firstly, a simple univariate probit model that assumes that the unobservable 
characteristics that affect an individual’s chances of working in either formal or 
informal jobs are independent of those determining her propensity to be overeducated; 
and, secondly, a bivariate probit model that enables us to control for the likely 
endogeneity of the selection of the formal or informal job. Our results confirm that, 
conditional on other individual and family characteristics, formal workers present a 
significantly lower probability of being overeducated. This general result seems to be 
driven by the fact that male informal workers face a greater probability of being 
overeducated, whereas no significant differences are detected between informal and 
formal female workers. 
 
																																																								
2 Magnac (1991), Nuñez (2002), Maloney and Nuñez (2004), Floréz (2002), Kugler and Kugler (2009) and Mondragón-Vélez et 
al. (2010) for Colombia; Pradhan and van Soest for Bolivia (1995); Pratap and Quintin for Argentina (2006); Tansel (1999) for 
Turkey and Gong and Van Soest (2002) for Mexico.	
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the details 
concerning the data and some selected descriptors are given in section 2, while the 
empirical approach is presented in section 3. Section 4 summarizes the estimate 
results of the empirical models, section 5 presents some robustness checks and, 
finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We use data from the 2008 wave of the Colombian Household Survey (CHS), a 
repeated cross-section conducted by the National Statistics Department (DANE). This 
survey gathers information about employment conditions for a population aged 12 
years or more and includes data about income, occupation, industry, and firm size, in 
addition to the individual’s general characteristics of sex, age, marital status and 
educational attainment. Certain household characteristics, such as the head of the 
household, the number of children, and the level of education of all its members, are 
also included. The CHS covers the thirteen major metropolitan areas of Colombia, 
which in 2008 accounted for 45% of the country’s population. It should be noted that 
this survey has been used for various empirical studies analyzing labor market issues 
in Colombia (see, for example, Magnac, 1991; Attanasio et al., 2004 and Goldberg 
and Pavcnik, 2005). 
 
The analysis conducted herein was limited to employed individuals between the ages 
of 15 and 60 that were not undertaking formal studies and who reported working 
between 16 and 84 hours per week. Government employees, household employees, 
the self-employed, bosses or employers, unpaid family workers, workers without pay 
in enterprises or other family businesses and day laborers were not included in the 
sample. The subsequent sample used in the analysis comprised 15,104 observations. 
 
As a starting point in our analysis, we had to use a criterion to determine whether a 
worker in the sample is overeducated, and if that worker is employed in the formal or 
informal job. Four basic methods have been suggested in the literature for measuring 
the education required for a job and, consequently, for determining overeducation. 
The first ‘subjective’ approach uses self-assessment to define the job’s educational 
requirements and then compares this with the worker’s actual education (Battu et al., 
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2000 and McGuinness, 2003). The second is a variation on the above and involves 
asking the worker directly whether he or she is overeducated (Devillanova, 2012). 
Overeducation can also be calculated objectively by using job analysts definitions of 
the educational requirement for each occupation, as available in the United States 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and comparing this with the workers educational 
level (Rumberger, 1987; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Kiker and Santos, 1991; 
Chevalier; 2003). An alternative objective measure is obtained by analyzing the 
distribution of education in each occupation; employees who depart from the mean 
(Verdugo and Verdugo 1989) or mode (Mendes de Oliviera et al. 2000) by more than 
one standard deviation are classified as being overeducated. This last approach is 
usually known as the ‘statistical’ method.   
 
Since the CHS does not supply information to construct a subjective measure of 
overeducation, and taking into account that the requirements of education in the rather 
broad categories of occupations (two-digit ISCO classification) available in the CHS 
are likely to differ from those in the US economy, we decided to follow other studies 
in the literature in applying the ‘statistical’ approach based on the mean of the 
distribution of education within each two-digit occupation.3 By using such an 
objective measure, the overall incidence of overeducation in the sample was found to 
be 15%, a figure similar to that reported for other developing economies (Quinn and 
Rubb, 2006) and lower than the incidence of overeducation in developed economies 
(McGuinness, 2006).  
 
As regards informality, alternative definitions and corresponding ways of measuring it 
have been proposed in the literature. This lack of consensus largely reflects issues of 
data availability in each study. In the particular case of Colombia, according to 
DANE, informal workers are those who fall into at least one of these categories: (i) 
work in firms with five or fewer employees; (ii) are unpaid family workers and 
housekeepers; (iii) are self employed who work in places of up to five persons other 
than independent professionals and technicians; or (iv) are business owners of firms 
																																																								
3 As stressed in Ramos and Sanromà (2011), a two-digit classification of occupations is not optimal for applying the mode 
criterion. In addition, Mehta et al. (2011) emphasized that the modal education is more prone to shift even when technology and 
the jobs-pool do not.  In any case, we also computed the results of the following sections using the mode criterion, and the main 
conclusions remained the same as those derived from results using the mean criteria (results are available upon request). 
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with five or less employees. This definition, in line with that proposed by the 
International Labor Office, has been criticized in the literature because it does not take 
into account the benefits associated with formal employment, such as inclusion in the 
social security system (Flórez, 2000). Nevertheless, the data made available by the 
CHS allow us to determine whether the workers in the sample are covered or not by 
the social security system, and it even distinguishes between contributions to the 
retirement pension and to the health system. Using this information, we classified 
workers as formally or informally employed according to their degree of inclusion in 
the social security system. That is to say, an individual was classified as a formal 
worker if she contributed to both health and retirement pension systems. Applying 
this condition, as many as 33.3% of individuals in the entire sample worked in 
informal jobs.4 
 
The incidence of overeducation in the entire sample and in the two jobs, and the 
percentage of Colombian workers in the formal and in the informal jobs are shown in 
the first set of rows in Table 1. This table also displays basic summary statistics 
concerning the distribution of the individual and job characteristics considered in the 
subsequent analysis, distinguishing in this regard between workers in the formal and 
informal jobs. In addition, to obtain some insights into differences by gender in the 
magnitudes under analysis, figures were computed for the entire sample and for men 
and women separately.  
 
As mentioned above, 15% of Colombian urban workers were overeducated, this 
figure being higher in the case of formal workers (17%) than for those employed in 
informal jobs (11%). This gap of six percentage points is found for both male and 
female workers. As for the distribution of workers in each job, around one third had 
an informal job in 2008, this percentage being higher for men (35%) than for women 
(31%). Differences in overeducation between the two jobs, and by gender, might 
simply be caused by disparities in the distribution of the characteristics that are 
assumed to affect the incidence of overeducation. Actually, the comparison of the 
figures reported in Table 1 confirms that there are substantial differences in some of 
the observable worker and job characteristics of formal and informal workers. As a 
																																																								
4 Self-employment in Latin America generally constitutes one of the principle sources of employment and a large proportion of 
the self-employed operate in the informal sector. If the sample is not restricted to exclude self-employees, the percentage of 
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matter of example, the number of years of schooling, as a measure of education, are 
not only useful as a proxy for general human capital but they are also likely to be 
correlated with unobserved individual ability. What the figures show is that informal 
workers are more likely to have education levels below those of formal workers: 
whereas 45% of informal workers in the entire sample have at most basic secondary 
education, the percentage of workers in formal jobs with secondary or tertiary 
education is as high as 81% (45% with tertiary education). If, as expected, there is a 
strong association between education and the likelihood of overeducation, such a gap 
in educational attainment could explain much of the difference observed in the 
overeducation figures between the two jobs. 
 
There are significant differences in other characteristics as well. The percentage of 
female workers in formal jobs is higher than that in informal, perhaps due to the fact 
that our sample excludes self-employed individuals. A much larger proportion of the 
workforce in formal jobs is married, and workers in those jobs tend to accumulate 
much more tenure than informal workers, suggesting a higher stability of employment 
for formal workers. As for the occupational structure, the share of informal workers in 
unskilled manufacturing and agricultural occupations (42%), and the share in 
merchant, vendor and service jobs (36%) is larger than that in formal jobs, while 
administrative staff (24%) and professionals and technicians are more strongly 
represented in formal jobs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that more than two thirds of 
informal workers are employed in small firms, with 10 or less workers. This is in 
sharp contrast with figures of formal jobs, where more than half formal workers work 
in firms with more than 100 employees, and around two thirds in firms with at least 
50 employees. In short, these figures indicate a close connection between informality 
and firm size in Colombia. 
 
As for the gender component, Table 1 shows that male and female workers differ in 
some of the characteristics that are supposed to affect overeducation. Interestingly, the 
most remarkable differences affect the distribution of education levels and 
occupations. Broadly speaking, female workers are more highly educated than their 
male counterparts, and find themselves concentrated in occupations such as 
																																																																																																																																																														
informal workers increases up to 59% for 2008.	
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administrative staff (24%), merchant and vendor jobs (22%) and service work (20%), 
while men are more highly concentrated in unskilled manufacturing and agricultural 
occupations (48%), which are associated with higher levels of informality. 
 
This simple descriptive analysis suggests i) the presence of quite large levels of 
overeducation in Colombia, ii) apparently, affecting more intensively formal workers 
than in the informal workers, and iii) that formal and informal workers differ in their 
levels of educational attainment, occupational distribution, and other individual and 
job characteristics, which are thought to exert an influence on the individual’s 
probability of being overeducated. Since the greater incidence of overeducation in 
formal jobs might well be caused by a composition effect (for example, associated 
with the higher education of workers in that jobs), in the section that follows we 
estimate the impact of informality on overeducation but in relation to the conditioning 
factors of observable worker and job characteristics. 
 
3. Informality and overeducation. Empirical specification 
 
A multivariate empirical model needs to be specified in order to assess the impact of 
formal or informal jobs on the probability of Colombian workers being overeducated, 
conditional on other observed individual, household and job characteristics. In so 
doing, we first assume that the allocation of a worker to a formal or informal job is 
exogenous to her chances of being overeducated. Under such an assumption, a 
univariate probabilistic specification provides consistent estimates of the effect of the 
job on the chances of the worker having more education than that required for her 
occupation. However, the endogeneity assumption can easily be questioned. Were this 
to be the case, the standard probabilistic specification with exogenous covariates 
would lack consistency. To address this issue, we estimate the effect of the sector by 
means of a bivariate specification in which this variable is instrumented. 
 
Briefly, a simple way to identify the determinants of educational mismatch is to 
assume a latent continuous (unobserved) variable Yi
*  for the probability of 
overeducation of worker i, which is related to a linear index function and an additive 
error term, i : 
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Yi
*  Xi Si i  (1) 
 
where Xi  is a vector of individual and firm characteristics (including age, gender, 
marital status, head of household, education, tenure, occupation, industry sector, 
contract type and the unemployment rate of the metropolitan area), Si  is a dummy 
variable for the job (formal or informal), and i is a normally distributed error with 
zero mean and unit variance. 
 
The observed dichotomous realization Yi  of the latent variable Yi
*  is as follows: 
 
Yi 1 if the individual is overeducated (Yi*  0) 
Yi  0 otherwise 
 
Given the normality of the error term in (1) a probit specification can be used to 
estimate the effect of the job on the probability of being overeducated, conditional on 
the other characteristics in X: 
 
prob Yi 1   prob Xi Si i  0    Xi Si   (2) 
 
where [] is the evaluation of the standard normal cdf.  
 
Since the estimate of the coefficient α is only informative about the sign of the impact 
of S, its associated marginal effect is computed from the estimates of the probit model 
in (2) as: 
 
 P(Y 1) /S X  ( X
 )( X ) (3) 
 
where the bar over the X denotes the sample average. 
 
As indicated above, the assumption made in the specification of the univariate probit 
in (2) is that the job (formal or informal) is exogenous to the probability of being 
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overeducated. However, if the assignment of workers to each of the sectors is not 
random and some unobservable factors (ability among others) that influence the 
probability of being assigned to a particular job are also affecting the probability of 
being overeducated, then the estimation of a univariate probit would suffer from 
selection bias.5 This would have dramatic consequences on the inference since the 
estimates from the univariate probit would be inconsistent if this endogeneity was 
ignored. 
 
To take account of this potential drawback properly, in a second step, we estimate the 
effect of the job in a bivariate probit model, in which the job is instrumented by 
family characteristics. In addition to the latent outcome equation in (1), the bivariate 
model is based on an additional equation for the latent model linking the probability 
of assignment to the formal or informal job to a set of characteristics: 
 
Si
* Zi i  (4) 
 
where Zi is a vector of observed individual and family characteristics, and i is a 
normally distributed error term. Zi includes the set of characteristics in Xi plus some 
additional variables used as instruments for the assignment to the job, Si
* . 
 
Since we can only observe the job for each individual, the link between the observed 
binary variable Si and the latent variable Si
* is assumed to be as follows: 
 
Si 1 if the individual works in the formal sector (Si*  0) 
Si  0 otherwise 
 
Therefore, the probit specification associated with the probability of working in a 
formal job, conditioned to the characteristics in Z, stands as: 
 
																																																								
5 We have ignored another type of selection whereby an individual might not accept a job that does not match his or her level of 
education and chooses instead to be unemployed or to remain outside the labor force. We argue that this selection bias is 
irrelevant in the case of Colombia where there is no unemployment benefit system and the family protection network against 
unemployment is low or exclusive to a group of high-income individuals. 	
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                         prob Si 1   prob Zi i  0    Zi                          (5) 
 
The bivariate probit thus consists of equations (2) and (5), where i and i are 
distributed bivariate normal, with E[i] =  E[i] = 0, var[i] = var[i] = 1 and cov[i,i] 
= . In other words, the empirical model allows for the likely correlation of the 
unobserved determinants of overeducation and the unobserved determinants of the 
sector. In such a framework, there are four possible states of the world (Yi= 0 or 1 and 
Si = 0 or 1), and the corresponding log-likelihood function associated to this set of 
events is (for further details see Wooldridge p.478, 2002): 
 
L  ln2[Xi Si,Zi,]
Yi1,Si1
 
ln2[Xi,Zi,]
Yi1,Si0
 
ln2[Xi Si,Zi,]
Yi0,Si1
 
ln2[Xi,Zi,]
Yi0,Si0

 
 
 
(6) 
 
The inference in the bivariate probit model is based on the maximization of the log-
likelihood in eq. (6) with respect to the parameters , ,  and . If  is statistically 
different from 0, estimates from the bivariate probit are preferable; otherwise 
conclusions regarding the impact of the sector could be based on the estimate of the 
univariate probit in eq. (2).6 Marginal effects are computed from the estimates of the 
bivariate probit model using a similar formulation to that for the univariate probit 
model.  
 
Two issues that usually result from the estimation of a bivariate probit model with an 
endogenous binary regressor are identification and the selection of valid instruments. 
Identification can be achieved by relying solely on the functional form and the 
distributional assumptions. However, the objective of forming a consistent estimator 
for  becomes manageable if we can construct at least one instrument for Si . A 
																																																								
6 A bivariate probit model with an endogenous binary regressor has been used in, for instance, Evans and Schwab (1995) to 
analyze the effect of catholic schools on finishing high school and starting college.	
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variable Ii would be a valid instrument for Si if it were a determinant of the sector of 
employment and it were not correlated with the error term of the overeducation 
equation (outcome equation). The first condition is easy to check; we can verify 
whether Zi  is correlated with Si , once the other variables have been controlled for. 
However, it is harder to test if the instrument is valid or not. In the context of the 
bivariate probit model, this condition relies on the economic or institutional 
knowledge related to the problem under study. 
 
As in many other studies, finding suitable instrumental variables is far from 
straightforward, since almost any regressor that determines the probability of being 
overeducated could plausibly affect assignment into formal and informal jobs as well. 
Previews studies about informality, control for household characteristics that may 
affect a person’s propensity to have an informal job such as the number of children in 
a household, number of inactive adults in a household, and earnings of other 
household members (Hill, 1983; Magnac, 1991, Marcouiller et al., 1997; Goldberg 
and Pavcnik, 2003; Maloney, 2004). To the best of our knowledge, in the over-
education literature only Mavromaras and McGuinness (2012) use the presence of 
children as a control variable in probit estimations of overskilling. 7 The authors only 
report a marginal statistical significance for the coefficient of this variable, and only 
for the group of moderately overskilled workers. Thus, it could be the case that certain 
family characteristics influence an individual’s choice regarding formal or informal 
employment but do not affect overeducation, such as the presence of children in the 
household and the earnings of other household members. One reason why such family 
characteristics may affect the sector of employment is because they are closely related 
to the households income needs. For instance, having more children means more 
expenses for the household and increase the need of finding a job, which is 
presumably more easily available in the informal sector. On the other side, informal 
sector is characterized by greater flexibility in the working hours, which aids 
combining working life with childcare. The assumption here is that the presence of 
children does not exert a significant effect on the propensity to be overeducated. 
																																																								
7	The authors define overskilling as the situation where a worker reports that their skills (related to education and work 
experience) are not fully utilised in their job. 
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Another family characteristic that is thought to influence the choice of employment 
sector but not the individual’s propensity to be overeducated is the social status, 
which we suggest is captured by the educational achievement of other members of the 
household. Accordingly, we construct the average number of years of schooling of 
other household members and use this as an additional instrument for the sector of 
employment.  
 
4. Informality and overeducation. Results 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients when running the univariate 
probit model are reported in Table 2 both for the entire sample and separately for 
male and female workers. The corresponding marginal effects for the average 
individual as defined in eq. (3) are also reported. Our results show that after 
controlling for other characteristics, formal workers are less likely to be overeducated 
than their informal counterparts. In other words, when we compare formal and 
informal workers with similar individual, household, and firm characteristics, those in 
the former group have a lower propensity to be overeducated. This contrasts sharply 
with the raw probabilities derived from the sample since, as the descriptive analysis in 
section 2 shows, the share of overeducated workers in formal jobs is greater than that 
in informal jobs. Thus, these results suggest that a sorting effect drives the gap in the 
raw propensities. 
 
Yet, it should be mentioned that the marginal effect associated with working in formal 
jobs is of a moderate magnitude. The probability that a formal worker is overeducated 
is just 2.5 percentage points (pp) less than that for an otherwise similar informal 
worker. The impact on probability is even lower for men at 1.86 pp, and somewhat 
higher for women at 2.72 pp. Interestingly, the coefficient and the corresponding 
marginal effect are statistically significant only at the 5% confidence level in the 
separate samples for both genders. Thus, the results from the univariate probit model 
suggest a modest impact of formality on overeducation having first controlled for 
education and other observable characteristics.  
 
In the case of the estimates of the coefficients for the control variables, the results 
shown in Table 2 are consistent with previous findings in the literature. For the sake 
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of brevity, we only comment on the results for the whole sample. As expected, the 
probability of being overeducated increases with educational attainment (Alba-
Ramirez, 1993; Kiker et al., 1997 and Quinn and Rubb, 2006). Overeducated workers 
may substitute education for a lack of job experience, taking jobs that require less 
education than they actually possess in order to accumulate experience and improve 
their chances of finding a better job match (Rosen, 1972; Sicherman and Galor, 1990 
and Mendes de Oliveira et al., 2000). As such, we expect overeducated workers to 
have less job experience. To test this hypothesis we use a variable that measures 
experience, specifically potential experience calculated as an individual’s age minus 
five years of education. On the other hand, several studies report that overeducation 
may have a negative effect on job satisfaction (Tsang et al., 1991), if this is the case, 
then overeducated workers with more tenure in a firm can be expected to be more 
prone to turnover. Consequently we hypothesize that overeducated workers will have 
less tenure. The results for the estimated marginal effect of general experience 
confirm the expected negative effect of this variable on the probability of an average 
worker in the sample being overeducated. However, it should be pointed out that this 
marginal effect is only significantly different from zero at a 10% confidence level. 
The impact of tenure is also negative, though almost negligible and, not in fact 
statistically significant. Therefore, the results for Colombia are in conflict with the 
evidence on the substitutability between education and other forms of human capital 
postulated by the human capital theory, according to which overeducation might be 
seen as a transitory situation. 
 
The results also indicate that females are less likely to be overeducated than males 
presenting similar characteristics, and that marital status does not have a statistically 
significant impact on the probability of being overeducated for both genders. 
Significant differences do exist however in terms of industry and firm size. Compared 
to individuals employed in Agriculture, mining, electricity, gas and water (our 
reference category), those employed in construction are more likely to be 
overeducated, while those working in transportation, financial intermediation and 
social services are less likely to be overeducated. As for firm size, the incidence of 
overeducation conditional on other characteristics is slightly lower for small (4 to 50 
workers) and substantially lower for medium size firms (51 to 100 workers). Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that local labor market conditions do not seem to be relevant, 
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as the coefficient of the metropolitan unemployment rate, although positive, is not 
statistically significant. 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that the specification used to obtain these results 
assumes the exogeneity of the employment and the absence of a simultaneous impact 
of the unobservable characteristics on the probability of overeducation and on the 
assignment of formal or informal jobs. The violation of these assumptions would 
invalidate the results. 
 
Our estimates of the effect of the job, when relaxing the assumption of exogeneity and 
the lack of correlation between the unobservable variables that influence both 
overeducation and formality/informality, are summarized in Table 3. These results 
correspond to the maximum likelihood estimates obtained from the bivariate probit 
model described in section 3, using instruments for the employment sector and the 
same set of control variables as those employed in the univariate probit model. Here, 
the discussion focuses solely on the coefficients of the equation for the probability of 
being overeducated since the estimates obtained for the parameters in the 
formal/informal sector equation (see Table A1 in the appendix) are relatively 
standard, and largely conform to results reported elsewhere (Magnac, 1991 and 
Pradhan and van Soest, 1995). Below, we first examine the entire sample of 
Colombian workers, and then discuss the differences that emerge between the samples 
of male and female workers. 
 
The coefficient of the formal job and the corresponding marginal effect are estimated 
to be negative and highly significant. In fact, the magnitude of the marginal effect of 
working in formal jobs estimated from the bivariate probit model is substantially 
higher than that estimated by the univariate probit model. The results suggest that, for 
otherwise similar workers, working in formal jobs reduces the probability of 
overeducation by 16.44 pp. This finding confirms that selection bias strongly affects 
the estimate of the effect of the employment sector on the probability of being 
overeducated and, hence, the need to account for it. On the other hand, it seems that, 
in addition to the benefits associated with receiving social security and higher wages, 
being a formal worker also ensures a better use of one’s skills in the workplace. Or, 
alternatively, informal workers, in addition to receiving lower wages and no health 
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and pension cover, are less likely to make proper use of their acquired knowledge in 
the workplace. As discussed in the introduction, to the best of our knowledge this 
finding has not previously been recorded, and represents a novel contribution of this 
study. 
 
Note that the estimate of  (correlation between the error terms of the overeducation 
and the employment sector equations) is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that non-observable characteristics that exert a positive effect on the 
probability of being formal employed also have a positive impact on the probability of 
being overeducated. This could be interpreted as evidence that in the case of formal 
workers overeducation is caused, to some extent, by the desire to form part of the 
formal sector (better employment opportunities, social system protection, etc.). A 
worker with a certain level of education might take a job for which less education is 
actually required, simply because that job is protected, for example, by the minimum 
wage. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the positive effect of unobservable factors on the 
probability of being overeducated can be made from within an internal labor market 
framework (Doeringer and Piore, 1972). Internal labor markets are those in which 
workers are hired into entry-level jobs, while higher levels are filled from within. 
Certain rules differentiate the members of the internal labor market from outsiders and 
accord them rights and privileges that would not otherwise be available. Typically 
these internal rights include certain guarantees of job security and opportunities for 
career mobility. If an internal labor market exists, then there must be some jobs, 
presumably at high levels, that are filled almost exclusively through internal 
promotion and there must be other port-of-entry jobs, presumably at low levels, that 
are filled through external hiring. In this context, individuals in any given firm are 
hired into its lower or middle levels and subsequently succeed in advancing to higher 
levels. Workers that do not have the qualifications for particular entry-level jobs are 
thus excluded from accessing the entire job ladder. For this reason, workers may 
initially accept a job for which their actual education is higher than that actually 
required in exchange for the benefits of gaining access to an internal labor market. It 
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should be stressed that internal labor markets operate in the primary sector (formal) 
rather than in the secondary sector (informal).  
 
As for the estimate of the coefficients, and the associated marginal effects of the other 
observable characteristics in the overeducation equation, they are, in general, roughly 
identical to those estimated with the univariate probit, with the exception of firm size. 
The estimates from the bivariate probit model indicate that compared to individuals 
working for micro-firms (those with less than 10 workers), workers in small, medium 
and large firms are more likely to be overeducated. This result can be interpreted as 
follows: large firms usually have better job opportunities (as well as paying higher 
wages), and workers have better chances of being promoted and of receiving more on-
the-job training. These characteristics mean that job offers from large firms are valued 
highly by job seekers who might apply for vacancies in which the required level of 
education is less than the one they have acquired. Likewise, large firms in the formal 
sector are in a position to select the most highly skilled from the pool of available 
workers. Yet, it should be pointed out that the impact on overeducation is weaker in 
the case of medium size firms (between 50 and 100 workers), where the coefficient is 
not, in fact, statistically significant. 
 
Finally, we should stress that the results by gender point to a substantial difference in 
the impact of the job on the probability of being overeducated. Whereas, for a male, 
having a formal job reduces the propensity of overeducation by 20.09 pp compared to 
a similar informal male worker, for females the effect is lower, 10.71 pp and its only 
statistical significance at the 5% confidence level. Interestingly, for the female 
workers we do not find a significant correlation between the errors of the two 
equations in contrast with the highly significant correlation coefficient for males. 
 
6. Robustness checks. Validity of the instruments 
 
The estimates of the bivariate probit presented in Table 3 are consistent and unbiased 
as long as the instruments are correlated with the probability of working in formal or 
informal jobs but not with the error term of the over-education equation in (2). In 
order to investigate if the selected instruments are valid we implement a procedure 
suggested by Cohen-Zadar and Elder (2009) and also implemented by Kim (2011). 
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This approach is based on the idea that the instruments, presence of children and 
average years of education of the other members of the household, exert an effect on 
the probability of over-education only through the job, if it is formal or informal, but 
not directly. If the instruments do not influence the probability of overeducation apart 
from its effect on the job, it should have no effect in the overeducation in a subsample 
of workers for whom the probability of working in informal or formal jobs is closely 
to zero. One can argue that public employees are a specific group of workers for 
whom the probability of working in informal jobs is approximately zero.8 Then, for 
this subsample of workers, the instruments should have no effect in the probability of 
being overeducated. Table 4 reports the effects of the educational achievement of 
other members of the household and the presence of children estimated from a probit 
overeducation equation for public employees, conditioning on the other set of controls 
used for the estimates of the probit overeducation equation for private employees in 
Table 3. Results in Table 4, for the total sample and for women working in the public 
sector, confirm that the coefficients of the instruments are not statistically significant, 
which means that the instruments do not exert a direct effect on the probability of 
being overeducated. In the case of men the educational achievement of other members 
of the household is statistical significant only at 5% but its marginal effect is 
considerably low -0.0075. Although an insignificant estimate for the coefficient 
associated to this variable is not guarantee of exogeneity, it does provide some 
evidence that its use as an instrument is likely not to be problematic. 
Last as a sensitive analysis for the IV estimates, we estimate the effect of the sector of 
employment on the probability of being overeducated using different set of the 
instruments. This sensitive analysis is presented in Table 5. The results of the biprobit 
when using only as an instrument the presence of children are summarized in column 
2, whereas those using only the average years of education of the other members of 
the household as an instrument are shown in column 3. As it can be seen the results 
are fairly robust to the set of instrument chosen. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
8	As a matter of fact, only 3.9% of the public employees report that they don’t make contribution to the health and old insurance 
system in contrast with the 33% of workers from private firms.	
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7. Conclusions 
  
This study has sought to add to the overeducation literature examining developing 
countries by analyzing the connection between labor market segmentation (the 
modern, protected, formal sector, on the one hand, and the traditional, unprotected, 
informal sector, on the other) and overeducation in Colombia. To date, studies 
concerned with informality in developing countries have focused primarily on the size 
of this sector, on the effects of labor market rigidities on employment, wages and their 
distribution, and on the probability of a worker entering the informal sector. However, 
no attention has been paid to the effects that a large informal sector has on the way 
workers match their education with that required to perform their particular job. This 
study offers some new evidence in this respect.  
 
Using micro-data for Colombia, we have estimated two types of empirical models in 
order to test the relationship between overeducation and informality: a simple 
univariate probit model for the probability of being overeducated that includes the job 
in which the individual is employed as an explanatory factor, formal or informal; and 
a bivariate probit model with an endogenous regressor that considers that the 
assignment of workers to each of the jobs is not random and some unobservable 
factors which influence the probability of choosing a particular job, could also affect 
the probability of being overeducated. The results of the univariate probit estimation 
indicate that formal workers are less likely to be overeducated than their informal 
counterparts. However, we have also shown that the assignment of workers to the 
formal or informal jobs is not random and that some unobservable characteristics that 
influence the probability of choosing a particular job also affect the probability of 
being overeducated, particularly as regards male workers.  
 
The results obtained from the bivariate probit model for the probability of 
overeducation, once the potential endogeneity of sector choice and overeducation 
were taken into account, show that formal workers are less likely to be overeducated 
and that non-observable characteristics that exert a positive effect on the probability 
of being a formal worker have a positive impact on the probability of being 
overeducated, in the case of male workers only. This could be interpreted as evidence 
that for formal male workers, overeducation is caused, at least in part, by a desire to 
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have a formal job (better employment opportunities, social system protection, etc.). A 
worker with a good education may take a job for which less education is required, 
because that job is protected, for example, by the minimum wage.  
 
Although we are aware that our results have some shortcomings, including the fact 
that better and more suitable instruments might have been used, we believe that they 
are conclusive in terms of the correlations reported and in providing an initial 
understanding of the importance of the effect of labor market segmentation on the 
probability of being overeducated. According to our results it seems that, in addition 
to the benefits associated with receiving social security and earning higher wages, 
being a formal worker also ensures a better use of acquired skills in the workplace. To 
the best of our knowledge, no study has presented evidence of this to date. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the main variables in the analysis  
  Total Sample   Men   Women 
Variable Total Informal Formal   Total Informal Formal   Total Informal Formal
Overeducation 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.17 
Informal employment 0.33 - - 0.35 - - 0.31 - - 
Age (years) 33.93 32.38 34.69 34.09 32.19 35.11 33.71 32.67 34.17 
Experience (years) 17.97 18.23 17.85 18.77 18.64 18.84 16.91 17.60 16.60 
Tenure (months) 48.56 27.51 59.00 48.69 27.92 59.84 48.39 26.90 57.94 
Women 0.43 0.40 0.44 - - - - - - 
Married 0.53 0.48 0.55 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.41 0.39 0.42 
Household Head 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.21 0.23 0.21 
Educational Attainment 
Basic Primary or below 0.13 0.23 0.08 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.05 
Basic secondary 0.14 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.07 
Secondary 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.32 
Higher education or more 0.36 0.18 0.45 0.28 0.13 0.37 0.46 0.26 0.56 
Education (years) 10.96 9.16 11.85 10.32 8.55 11.27 11.80 10.07 12.57 
Occupation 
Unskilled manufacture and agricultural 0.33 0.42 0.28 0.48 0.60 0.41 0.13 0.15 0.12 
Professionals and Technicians 1 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 
Professionals and Technicians 2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Managers and Public Officials 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Administrative Staff 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.33 
Merchant and Vendor 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.21 
Service Worker 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.15 
Firm size 
Micro (1 -10 workers) 0.32 0.68 0.15 0.33 0.68 0.14 0.31 0.67 0.16 
Small (11 - 50 workers) 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.23 
Medium (51 - 100 workers) 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.08 
Large (101 workers or more) 0.39 0.11 0.53 0.38 0.10 0.53 0.40 0.13 0.53 
Sector 
Agricultural, mining, electricity, gas and water 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Industry 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Construction 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.44 0.26 
Transportation 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Financial Intermediation 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.15 
Social Services 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.21 0.29 
Observations 15104 5006 10098   8629 3013 5616   6475 1993 4482 
 
Note:  Figures are in percentages, excepting Age, Experience, Tenure and Education whose 
units of measurement are indicated in parenthesis.  
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Table 2. Estimates from the univariate probit over-education model 
  Total   Men   Women 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect   Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect   Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect 
Formal job -0.1498** -0.0250** -0.1321* -0.0186* -0.1457* -0.0272*  
[0.0384] [0.0065]  [0.0518] [0.0073]  [0.0579] [0.0109]   
Schooling years 0.2409** 0.0401** 0.2700** 0.0381** 0.2166** 0.0404** 
[0.0056] [0.0012]  [0.0078] [0.0017]  [0.0087] [0.0018]   
Experience (years) 0.0096+ -0.0006+ -0.001 -0.0015 0.0190* 0.0011*  
[0.0056] [0.0003]  [0.0081] [0.0004]  [0.0082] [0.0005]   
Experience2 -0.0004* - -0.0002 - -0.0004+ - 
[0.0001] - [0.0002] - [0.0002] - 
Tenure (months) -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 0 -0.0009 -0.0002 
[0.0006] [0.0001]  [0.0008] [0.0001]  [0.0009] [0.0001]   
Tenure2 0 - 0 - 0 - 
[0.0000] - [0.0000] - [0.0000] - 
Women -0.2398** -0.0400** - - - - 
[0.0419] [0.0070]  - - - - 
Married -0.0232 -0.0039 0.0111 0.0016 -0.0505 -0.0094 
[0.0493] [0.0082]  [0.0524] [0.0074]  [0.0458] [0.0086]   
Women Married -0.001 -0.0002 - - - - 
[0.0661] [0.0110]  - - - - 
Household head -0.049 -0.0082 -0.0283 -0.004 0.0744 0.0139 
[0.0493] [0.0082]  [0.0525] [0.0074]  [0.0532] [0.0099]   
Women Household head 0.1782* 0.0297*  - - - - 
[0.0712] [0.0119]  - - - - 
Industry 0.0737 0.0123 0.1432 0.0202 -0.04 -0.0075 
[0.0845] [0.0141]  [0.1068] [0.0150]  [0.1507] [0.0281]   
Construction 0.5034** 0.0839** 0.6339** 0.0894** -0.1767 -0.033 
[0.0983] [0.0164]  [0.1207] [0.0171]  [0.2187] [0.0408]   
Sales, Hotels, Restaurants -0.1029 -0.0171 -0.1376 -0.0194 -0.0354 -0.0066 
[0.0848] [0.0142]  [0.1082] [0.0153]  [0.1490] [0.0278]   
Transportation -0.3531** -0.0588** -0.4494** 
-
0.0634** -0.1926 -0.0359 
[0.0928] [0.0156]  [0.1207] [0.0173]  [0.1590] [0.0297]   
Financial Intermediation -0.4160** -0.0693** -0.5263** 
-
0.0742** -0.2867+ -0.0535+  
[0.0895] [0.0150]  [0.1167] [0.0167]  [0.1533] [0.0286]   
Social Services -0.4907** -0.0818** -0.7589** 
-
0.1070** -0.3402* -0.0635*  
[0.0879] [0.0147]  [0.1214] [0.0173]  [0.1487] [0.0277]   
Firm Size Small -0.0271 -0.0045 -0.0945 -0.0133 0.0594 0.0111 
[0.0428] [0.0071]  [0.0584] [0.0082]  [0.0640] [0.0120]   
Firm Size Medium -0.2150** -0.0358** -0.2305* -0.0325* -0.1645 -0.0307 
[0.0662] [0.0110]  [0.0896] [0.0126]  [0.1012] [0.0189]   
Firm Size Large 0.0022 0.0004 -0.1092+ -0.0154+ 0.1421* 0.0265*  
[0.0414] [0.0069]  [0.0573] [0.0081]  [0.0609] [0.0114]   
Metropolitan Area 
Unemployment Rate 0.0054 0.0009 0.0049 0.0007 0.0082 0.0015 
[0.0078] [0.0013]  [0.0108] [0.0015]  [0.0114] [0.0021]   
Constant -3.6861** - -3.9013** - -3.8544** - 
[0.1484] - [0.2000] - [0.2373] - 
Observations 15675     8890     6785   
Log pseudolikelihood  -5242.92     -2800.57     -2384.24   
 
Notes: standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3. Estimates from the bivariate probit model for the over-education equation.  
  Total  Men  Women 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect  Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect  Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect 
Formal job -0.9075** -0.1644** -1.1884** -0.2009** -0.5617* -0.1071*  
[0.1760] [0.0380]  [0.2030] [0.0468]  [0.2242] [0.0459]   
Schooling years 0.2509** 0.0454** 0.2750** 0.0465** 0.2250** 0.0429** 
[0.0056] [0.0021]  [0.0080] [0.0030]  [0.0094] [0.0026]   
Experience (years) 0.0122* -0.0002*  0.0079 -0.0009 0.0171* 0.0011*  
[0.0056] [0.0003]  [0.0078] [0.0004]  [0.0083] [0.0006]   
Experience2 -0.0004** - -0.0004+ - -0.0003 - 
[0.0001] - [0.0002] - [0.0002] - 
Tenure (months) 0.0007 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 0 
[0.0006] [0.0001]  [0.0008] [0.0001]  [0.0011] [0.0001]   
Tenure2 0.0000 - 0 - 0 - 
[0.0000] - [0.0000] - [0.0000] - 
Women -0.2013** -0.0365** - - - - 
[0.0421] [0.0075]  - - - - 
Married 0.0278 0.005 0.0647 0.0109 -0.0566 -0.0108 
[0.0525] [0.0095]  [0.0541] [0.0092]  [0.0462] [0.0089]   
Women Married -0.0614 -0.0111 - - - - 
[0.0682] [0.0124]  - - - - 
Household head -0.0661 -0.012 -0.0466 -0.0079 0.0792 0.0151 
[0.0520] [0.0094]  [0.0537] [0.0091]  [0.0586] [0.0111]   
Women Household 
head 0.1967* 0.0356*  - - - - 
[0.0765] [0.0137]  - - - - 
Industry 0.0362 0.0066 0.0902 0.0153 -0.0577 -0.011 
[0.0847] [0.0153]  [0.1046] [0.0176]  [0.1511] [0.0289]   
Construction 0.3834** 0.0694** 0.4043** 0.0683** -0.1085 -0.0207 
[0.1026] [0.0179]  [0.1249] [0.0199]  [0.2180] [0.0416]   
Sales, Hotels, 
Restaurants -0.1266 -0.0229 -0.1639 -0.0277 -0.0343 -0.0065 
[0.0846] [0.0154]  [0.1057] [0.0180]  [0.1491] [0.0285]   
Transportation -0.3724** -0.0674** -0.4605** -0.0778** -0.2033 -0.0388 
[0.0924] [0.0171]  [0.1177] [0.0205]  [0.1593] [0.0305]   
Financial 
Intermediation -0.4038** -0.0731** -0.4760** -0.0805** -0.2901+ -0.0553+  
[0.0903] [0.0163]  [0.1164] [0.0196]  [0.1539] [0.0293]   
Social Services -0.5382** -0.0975** -0.8044** -0.1360** -0.3604* -0.0687*  
[0.0881] [0.0166]  [0.1196] [0.0217]  [0.1491] [0.0286]   
Firm Size Small 0.2540** 0.0460** 0.3062** 0.0518** 0.2190* 0.0418*  
[0.0765] [0.0154]  [0.0982] [0.0194]  [0.0986] [0.0198]   
Firm Size Medium 0.1438 0.0261 0.2765* 0.0467*  0.0326 0.0062 
[0.1029] [0.0194]  [0.1288] [0.0241]  [0.1383] [0.0265]   
Firm Size Large 0.3624** 0.0656** 0.4151** 0.0702** 0.3382** 0.0645** 
[0.0901] [0.0186]  [0.1147] [0.0233]  [0.1129] [0.0232]   
Metropolitan Area 
Unemployment Rate -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0009 0.0062 0.0012 
[0.0079] [0.0014]  [0.0106] [0.0018]  [0.0118] [0.0022]   
Constant -3.4673** - -3.4839** - -3.7693** - 
[0.1702] - [0.2268] - [0.2544] - 
 0.4347** - 0.5987** - 0.2424+ - 
[0.1211] - [0.1670] - [0.1331] - 
Observations 15104    8629    6475   
Log pseudolikelihood  -11384.32    -6346.62    -4952.43   
 
Notes: standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 4. Reduced-form relationship between family characteristics and overeducation 
probability among public employees. 
  Total   Men   Women 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect   Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect   Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Average years of education 
other members -0.0169 -0.0036 -0.0385* -0.0075*  -0.0057 -0.0013 
[0.0117] [0.0025]   [0.0192] [0.0037]   [0.0155] [0.0035]   
Number of kids age 0 0.2367 0.051 0.226 0.0438 0.3455 0.0773 
[0.1832] [0.0395]   [0.2525] [0.0490]   [0.2823] [0.0631]   
Number of kids age 1 0.0261 0.0056 -0.1384 -0.0268 0.3952 0.0884 
[0.2318] [0.0500]   [0.3191] [0.0617]   [0.3319] [0.0741]   
Number of kids age 2 0.1287 0.0278 0.1939 0.0376 0.0395 0.0088 
[0.2065] [0.0445]   [0.3155] [0.0614]   [0.2791] [0.0625]   
Number of kids age 3 -0.0103 -0.0022 0.1534 0.0297 -0.2101 -0.047 
[0.1643] [0.0354]   [0.2066] [0.0398]   [0.2831] [0.0634]   
Number of kids age 4 0.105 0.0226 0.3126 0.0605 -0.49 -0.1097 
[0.1679] [0.0362]   [0.2156] [0.0415]   [0.3222] [0.0721]   
Number of kids age 5 0.1433 0.0309 0.0563 0.0109 0.2933 0.0656 
[0.1860] [0.0401]   [0.2602] [0.0504]   [0.2904] [0.0649]   
Number of kids age 6 -0.0861 -0.0186 -0.0475 -0.0092 -0.2374 -0.0531 
[0.1948] [0.0420]   [0.2894] [0.0560]   [0.2814] [0.0632]   
Number of kids age 7 -0.0882 -0.019 -0.1797 -0.0348 0.0336 0.0075 
[0.1528] [0.0330]   [0.2163] [0.0418]   [0.2103] [0.0471]   
Number of kids age 8 0.0324 0.007 -0.3145 -0.0609 0.2897 0.0648 
[0.1690] [0.0365]    [0.2365]    [0.0457]  [0.2189] [0.0489]   
Observations 1823     882     938   
Log pseudolikelihood  -691.89739     -304.19913     -368.02025   
 
Notes: standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Other explanatory variables, except 
the sector of employment, listed in Table 2 are also included in the regression 
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Table 5. Estimates of the sector of employment on over-education with different set of 
instruments. 
 
Total     Biprobit - IV 
Probit [1] [2] [3] 
Formal job -0.0250** -0.1644** -0.1581** -0.1151**
[0.0065]   [0.0380]  [0.0438]  [0.0434]  
 - 0.4657** 0.4406** 0.2991* 
  -   [0.1211] [0.1395] [0.1390] 
Men Biprobit - IV 
Probit [1] [5] [4] 
Formal job -0.0186*  -0.2009** -0.2175** -0.1658**
[0.0073]   [0.0468]  [0.0459]  [0.0718]  
 - 0.6911** 0.7440** 0.5529* 
  -   [0.1670] [0.1642] [0.2527] 
Women Biprobit - IV 
Probit [1] [5] [4] 
Formal job -0.0272*  -0.1071* -0.0616 -0.0749+ 
[0.0109]   [0.0459]  [0.0444]  [0.0419]  
 - 0.2473+ 0.109 0.1455 
  -   [0.1331] [0.1322] [0.1220] 
Instruments           
Average years of education other members Yes Yes 
Num. Chidren 0 - 8 years old     Yes   Yes 
 
 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented. Standard errors are in brackets. The exogenous 
variables of individual’s characteristics, job’s characteristics and the unemployment rate of 
the metropolitan listed in Table 3 are included in all regressions. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table A1. Estimates from the bivariate probit model for the job equation (formal=1) 
  Total   Men   Women 
   Coefficient    Coefficient   Coefficient 
Schooling years 0.0720** 0.0597** 0.0889** 
[0.0051] [0.0063] [0.0084] 
Experience 0.0309** 0.0345** 0.0283** 
[0.0042] [0.0057] [0.0065] 
Experience2 -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] 
Tenure (months) 0.0089** 0.0070** 0.0117** 
[0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0009] 
Tenure2 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Women 0.1124** - - 
[0.0392] - - 
Married 0.1578** 0.1240* -0.0284 
[0.0490] [0.0502] [0.0448] 
Women Married -0.2146** - - 
[0.0625] - - 
Household head 0.0123 0.0002 -0.0674 
[0.0472] [0.0475] [0.0534] 
Women Household head -0.1344* - - 
[0.0668] - - 
Industry -0.1677+ -0.1422 -0.1744 
[0.0895] [0.1025] [0.1754] 
Construction -0.4423** -0.4828** -0.3387 
[0.0961] [0.1072] [0.2387] 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants -0.0913 -0.0659 -0.0949 
[0.0893] [0.1028] [0.1739] 
Transportation -0.156 -0.1542 -0.1814 
[0.0965] [0.1112] [0.1860] 
Financial Intermediation 0.1458 0.1435 0.1448 
[0.0964] [0.1131] [0.1829] 
Social Services -0.3247** -0.3393** -0.3206+ 
[0.0926] [0.1132] [0.1744] 
Firm Size Small 1.0304** 1.0576** 1.0007** 
[0.0319] [0.0418] [0.0499] 
Firm Size Medium 1.4108** 1.4002** 1.4456** 
[0.0556] [0.0698] [0.0925] 
Firm Size Large 1.6865** 1.7470** 1.6118** 
[0.0331] [0.0449] [0.0506] 
Metropolitan Area Unemployment Rate -0.0285** -0.0190* -0.0413** 
[0.0069] [0.0091] [0.0105] 
Average years of education other 
members 0.0301** 0.0360** 0.0243** 
[0.0046] [0.0060] [0.0071] 
Number of kids age 0 -0.0916* -0.1150* -0.0344 
[0.0439] [0.0528] [0.0771] 
Number of kids age 1 -0.0803+ -0.0920+ -0.0666 
[0.0432] [0.0558] [0.0680] 
Number of kids age 2 -0.0573 -0.0053 -0.1549* 
[0.0429] [0.0553] [0.0692] 
Number of kids age 3 -0.0761+ -0.0594 -0.0871 
[0.0449] [0.0562] [0.0732] 
Number of kids age 4 -0.0886* -0.0965+ -0.086 
[0.0441] [0.0564] [0.0694] 
Number of kids age 5 -0.0534 -0.0158 -0.0797 
[0.0453] [0.0580] [0.0724] 
Number of kids age 6 -0.0973* -0.0473 -0.1701* 
[0.0463] [0.0587] [0.0735] 
Number of kids age 7 -0.1567** -0.1384* -0.1752** 
[0.0435] [0.0579] [0.0658] 
Number of kids age 8 -0.1525** -0.0986 -0.2039** 
[0.0446] [0.0604] [0.0671] 
Constant -1.5313** -1.5984** -1.3881** 
[0.1395] [0.1748] [0.2426] 
Observations 15104   8629   6475 
Notes: standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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